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Abstract
Voting and assignment are two of the most fundamental settings in social
choice theory. For both settings, random serial dictatorship (RSD) is a well-
known rule that satisfies anonymity, ex post efficiency, and strategyproofness.
Recently, it was shown that computing the resulting probabilities is #P-complete
both in the voting and assignment setting. In this paper, we present efficient
parametrized algorithms to compute the RSD probabilities for parameters such
as the number of agent types, alternatives, or objects. When the parameters are
small, then the respective algorithms are considerably more efficient than the naive
approach of going through all permutations of agents.
Keywords: Social choice theory, random serial dictatorship, random priority,
computational complexity, assignment setting.
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1. Introduction
Voting and assignment are two of the most widely applied and important set-
tings in social choice theory. In both settings, although one could also use dis-
crete or deterministic rules, randomization is crucial to achieve minimal fairness
requirements such as anonymity and neutrality. In voting, agents express prefer-
ences over alternatives and a social decision scheme returns a probability distri-
bution over the alternatives based on the agents’ preferences [5, 12, 17]. In the
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assignment setting, agents express preferences over objects and a random assign-
ment rule returns a random assignment of the objects specifying the probability
with which each object is allocated to each agent [6, 7, 9]. The objects are referred
to as houses in the literature and the assignment setting is also known as house al-
location. For the two settings, RSD is a desirable social decision scheme [4, 12]
and random assignment rule [7, 10], respectively.
In the voting setting, random serial dictatorship (RSD) takes a permutation
of agents uniformly at random and then selects an alternative by serially allowing
agents in the permutation to refine the set of feasible alternatives. In the assign-
ment setting, RSD takes a permutation uniformly at random and then lets the
agents in the permutation serially take their most preferred house that has not yet
been allocated.
For both the settings mentioned above, RSD is a well-known rule that is
anonymous, strategyproof, and ex post efficient (randomizes over Pareto optimal
alternatives). In fact, it has been conjectured to be the only rule that satisfies these
properties [see e.g., 13, 16]. RSD is well-established and commonly used es-
pecially in resource allocation. In particular, the resulting probabilities of RSD
can be viewed as fractional allocations in scheduling and other applications (in
which the houses are in fact divisible) and hence important to compute [see e.g.,
1, 7, 8, 10, 20]. Similarly, in voting, the probabilities returned by the RSD rule
can be interpreted as fractions of time or resource allotted to the alternatives and
hence crucial to compute. The probability of each alternative can also be used as
a suggestion for the proportional representation of the alternative in representative
democracy or seat allocation of a parliament [2, 21].
The definition of RSD for both the settings suggests natural exponential-time
algorithms to compute the RSD probabilities: enumerate all the permutations
and for each permutation, perform a linear number of operations. However these
algorithms are naive and the question arises whether there are more efficient algo-
rithms to compute the RSD probabilities.
Recently, Aziz et al. [3] showed that the resulting probabilities of RSD are
#P-complete to compute both in the voting and the assignment settings. Indepen-
dently, Saban and Sethuraman [18] also showed the same result for the assignment
problem. In view of the inherent complexity of computing the RSD probabilities,
Saban and Sethuraman [18] mentioned that identifying the conditions under which
the problem is polynomial time as an open problem. Mennle and Seuken [14] pro-
pose random hybrid assignment mechanisms that hinge on the RSD probabilities.
They termed the problem of computing RSD probabilities in the assignment do-
main as a “very difficult research problem.”
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In view of the importance of RSD in both voting and resource allocation and
the recent negative computational results, we undertake an algorithmic study of
RSD . We show that RSD is amenable to efficient computation provided certain
structural parameters are small. More precisely, we undertake a parametrized
complexity analysis of RSD for both voting and assignment.
Standard vs. parametrized complexity. In standard computational complexity the-
ory, only the size of the problem instance is considered as a measure of the prob-
lem’s complexity. An algorithm is deemed to be efficient if its running time is
bounded by a polynomial function of the size of the instance; in other words, for
every instance I of the problem, the running time of the algorithm is bounded by
poly(|I|) where poly is a fixed polynomial independent of the instance and |I| is
the size of the instance. Unfortunately, not every problem is known to admit an
efficient algorithm. Indeed, researchers have identified certain classes of problems
that are thought not to admit efficient algorithms. For example, the fact that RSD
is #P-complete [3, 18] strongly suggests that there is no efficient algorithm for
computing the RSD probabilities.
In parametrized complexity theory, a finer multivariate analysis is undertaken
by considering multiple parameters of the problem instance [11, 15]. Intuively, a
parameter is some aspect of the problem input. For example, for computational
problems on graphs, the maximum degree of the graph is a natural parameter. Let
k be a parameter of an instance I . A problem with parameter k belongs to the
class FPT, or is said to be fixed-parameter tractable, if there exists an algorithm
that solves the problem in f(k) ·poly(|I|) time, where f is some computable func-
tion and poly is a polynomial both independent of I . The key idea behind FPT is
to separate out the complexity into two components—a component poly(|I|) that
depends solely on the size of the input, and a component f(k) that depends on the
parameter. An FPT algorithm with parameter k can solve instances in which the
input size of the instance is large as long as k is small and hence the growth of
f(k) is relatively small. Of course if k is not small and f(k) is, say, exponential
in k, then the running time of the FPT algorithm can become too slow for prac-
tical purposes. Nevertheless, designing FPT algorithms with different parameters
is important as they expand tractability frontier for problems that are otherwise
intractable in general.
Contributions. We propose algorithms to compute the RSD probabilities that un-
der reasonable assumptions are significantly more efficient than the naive method
of going over n! permutations of the agents. To be precise, we present FPT al-
gorithms with parameters such as # agent types, # alternatives, # alternative types
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and # houses. Many of our algorithms exploit different dynamic programming
formulations where the recursion is based on new insights into RSD applied to
voting and assignment. In this sense, our work not only yields more efficient al-
gorithms for computing an RSD lottery, but also furthers our understanding of a
keystone algorithm in social choice theory.
2. Voting Setting
We first define the voting setting and RSD formally. We follow the notation
used in [4]. A voting setting consists of a set N = {1, . . . , n} of agents having
preferences over a finite set A of alternatives where |A| = m. The preferences of
agents over alternatives are represented by a preference profile R = (R1, . . . , Rn)
where each agent i ∈ N has complete and transitive preferences Ri over A. By
(a, b) ∈ Ri, also denoted by a Ri b, we mean that alternative a is at least as
preferred by agent i as alternative b. We denote with Pi the strict part of Ri (a Pi b
if a Ri b but not b Ri a), and with Ii the symmetric part of Ri (a Ii b if a Ri b
and b Ri a). A preference relation Ri is linear if a Pi b or b Pi a for all distinct
alternatives a, b ∈ A. The size of an instance of a voting setting will be denoted
by |R| which is equal to |N | × |A|.
We let ΠN denote the set of all permutations of N and write a permutation
π ∈ ΠN as π = π(1) . . . π(n). If Ri is a preference relation and B ⊆ A a subset
of alternatives, then maxRi(B) = {a ∈ B : a Ri b for all b ∈ B} is the set of
most preferred alternatives from B according to Ri. Let π(i) be the i-th agent in
permutation π ∈ ΠN . Then,
RSD(N,A,R) =
∑
pi∈ΠN
1
n!
δuniform(Prio(N,A,R, π))
where
Prio(N,A,R, π) = max
Rpi(n)
( max
Rpi(n−1)
(· · · (max
Rpi(1)
(A)) · · · )),
and δuniform(B) is the uniform lottery over the multi-set B. In the literature,
Prio(N,A,R, π) is simply referred to as serial dictatorship with respect to or-
dering π. We illustrate how RSD works with the aid of a simple example.
Example 1 (Illustration of RSD in voting). Consider the following preference
profile.
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1 : a I1 b I1 c P1 d
2 : b I2 d P2 a P2 c
3 : c P3 a I3 b I3 d
Then let us consider the Prio outcomes for each permutation over the voters.
123 : {b} 132 : {c}
213 : {b} 231 : {b}
312 : {c} 321 : {c}
Thus the RSD lottery is [a : 0, b : 1/2, c : 1/2].
If each agent has a unique most preferred alternative, the RSD lottery can be
computed in linear time: the RSD probability of an alternative is the fraction of
agents who express it as most preferred. However, the problem of computingRSD
probabilities become #P-complete when agents do not express strict preferences.
As seen by the formal definition as well as the example above, RSD probabil-
ities can be computed by enumerating all the n! permutations over agents. We
present alternative algorithms to compute the RSD probabilities that are signifi-
cantly faster provided certain structural parameters are small.
Two agents are said to be of the same type if they have identical preferences.
Two alternatives are of the same type if every agent is indifferent between them.
The following lemma shows that without loss of generality we can focus on in-
stance where no two alternatives have the same type.
Lemma 1. There is a linear-time reduction from general instances of RSD to
simplified instances of RSD where no two alternatives have the same type.
Proof. Given an instance (N,A,R), we construct an equivalent simplified in-
stance (N,A′, R′) by contracting all alternatives of the same type into a ‘super’
alternative.
Given an RSD lottery for (N,A′, R′) we can construct a lottery for (N,A,R)
by uniformly dividing the RSD probability of the ‘super’ alternative among the
alternatives in A that induced it.
Unless otherwise stated, from now on, we assume that we are dealing with
simplified instances where no two alternatives have the same type.
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Let a ∈ A be a fixed but arbitrary alternative. For each i ∈ N , we define the
signature of i (with respect to a) to be (C,D) where C is the subset of alternatives
that are as good as a, and D is the subset of alternatives that are strictly better than
a; more formally, C = {b : b Ii a} and D = {b : b Pi a}. Notice that even if two
agents have different types, they can still have the same signature. On the other
hand, if two agents have the same type, they must have the same signature.
For notational convenience we enumerate all the signatures and denote the set
of signatures with S = {1, 2, . . .}. Let the ith signature be defined by the pair
(Ci, Di) and let ti > 0 be the number of agents having this signature. For a subset
X ⊆ S of signatures we use t(X) to denote
∑
i∈X ti. Since we are dealing with
a simplified instance, at least one agent is not indifferent between a given pair
of alternatives and hence each Prio outcome results in a singleton set. Hence, it
follows that ∩i∈NCi = {a}. In this way, running the serial dictatorship on any
permutation of the agents either does not select a or selects exactly a.
We show an FPT algorithm for computing RSD(R)(a) where the parameter
is the number of signatures |S|.
Theorem 1. In the voting setting, for each alternative a ∈ A there is an algorithm
for computing RSD(R)(a) that runs in O(|R|+m|S| · 2|S|) time.
Proof. For each X ⊂ S we define a residual problem where the set of alternatives
is
⋂
i∈S\X Ci, where there are no agents with a signature in S \ X , and where
we still have ti agents with signature i for each i ∈ X . For X = S the residual
problem is the same as the original problem. In the residual problem defined by
X we say a permutation of its agents is lucky if running the serial dictatorship
with this permutation selects alternative a. Our algorithm is based on a dynamic
programming formulation for counting the number of lucky permutations:
M [X ] = # lucky permutations in the residual problem defined by X . (1)
Notice that RSD(R)(a) = M [S]/n!, so if we can compute M , we are done. In
the rest of the proof, we derive a recurrence to do just that.
For each X ⊂ S we define the set of admissible signatures to be
φ(X) =

i ∈ X : Di ∩
⋂
j∈S\X
Cj = ∅


and
φ(S) = {i ∈ S : Di = ∅} .
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The key observation is that every lucky permutation in the residual problem de-
fined by X must start with an agent having an admissible signature.
To compute the value of the DP (dynamic program) states, we use the follow-
ing recurrence.
M [X ] =


t(X)! if φ(X) = X
0 if φ(X) = ∅∑
i∈φ(X)
ti!
(
t(X)− 1
ti − 1
)
M [X \ {i}] otherwise
(2)
Let us briefly justify each case of the recurrence. First, consider the case
φ(X) = X , which means that in the residual problem defined by X every agent
has a in its top equivalence class. If that is the case, then every permutation of
the agents is lucky. Since there are t(X) agents in the residual problem, it follows
that there are t(X)! lucky permutations.
Second, consider the case φ(X) = ∅, which means that in the residual problem
defined by X , not a single agent has a in its top equivalence class. If that is the
case, then there are no lucky permutations.
Finally, consider the case ∅ ⊂ φ(X) ⊂ X . Recall that every lucky permutation
must begin with an agent with a signature i ∈ φ(X). Notice that after such
an agent is chosen the set of possible alternatives is reduced to
⋂
j∈S\(X∪{i})Cj .
Also, the remaining agents (ti−1) agents with signature i do not further constrain
the set of alternatives. Therefore, if we take a lucky permutation in the residual
problem defined by X and we strip from it all agents with signature i, we are left
with a lucky permutation for the residual problem defined by X ∪ {i}. Similarly,
if we take a lucky permutation for the residual problem defined by X ∪ {i} and
we prepend one agent with signature i and insert the remaining ti − 1 agents
with signature i any way we want, we have a lucky permutation for the residual
problem defined by X . Notice that for each lucky permutation for X ∪ {i} there
are
(
t(X)−1
ti−1
)
ways of choosing the positions for the agents with signature i and
for each one of those there are ti! ways of distributing the individual agents. If
follows that there are
∑
i∈φ(X) ti!
(
t(X)−1
ti−1
)
M [X \ {i}] lucky permutations for the
residual problems defined by X .
Computing the signatures S and their frequencies t1, . . . , t|S| takes O(|R|)
time, where |R| is the total length of the agent preferences. Computing the ad-
missible signature function φ can be done in O(m |S| · 2|S|) time, where m is the
number of alternatives. The size of the DP table is 2|S|, and given all the previous
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information, computing each entry of the table takes O(|S|) time. Hence, the total
time to compute RSD(R)(a) is O(|R|+m|S| · 2|S|).
Corollary 1. There is an FPT algorithm for computing RSD(R)(a) with param-
eter n = # of agents. The running time is O(|R|+mn · 2n).
Proof. Two agents of the same type must have the same signature, so |S| ≤ n. It
follows from Theorem 1 that the running time is O(|R|+mn · 2n) = O(|R| · (1+
2n)) = O(poly(|R|) · (1 + 2n)) and hence the algorithm is FPT with parameter
n.
Corollary 2. There is an FPT algorithm for computing RSD(R)(a) with param-
eter T = # of agent types. The running time is O(|R|+mT · 2T ).
Proof. In the worst case, each agent type has a different signature, so |S| ≤ T .
It follows from Theorem 1 that the running time is O(|R|+mT · 2T ) = O(|R| ·
(1 + T · 2T )) = O(poly(|R|) · (1 + T · 2T )) and hence the algorithm is FPT with
parameter T .
Corollary 3. There is an FPT algorithm for computing RSD(R)(a) with param-
eter m = # of alternatives. The running time is O(|R|+m · 3m · 23m).
Proof. This follows from Theorem 1 and the fact that if there are m alternatives,
there are at most 3m different signatures (Ci, Di) because
m∑
k=1
(
m
k
)
2m−k = 3m,
where the first term of the left-hand-side product is the number of way of choosing
a subset Ci of size k and second term is how many choices we have for Di given
that |Ci| = k and Ci ∩Di = ∅. Therefore, |S| ≤ 3m.
Corollary 4. There is an FPT algorithm for computing RSD(R)(a) with param-
eter q = # of alternative types. The running time is O(|R|+ q · 3q · 23q).
Proof. This follows from Lemma 1 and Corollary 3.
3. Assignment Setting
An assignment setting is a triple (N,H,R), whereN is a set of n agents,H is a
set of m ≤ n houses, and R = (R1, . . . , Rn) is a preference profile that contains,
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for each agent i, a linear preference relation on some subset of houses that are
acceptable to the agent. If a house is unacceptable to an agent, then he would
prefer not to get any house than being allocated an unacceptable house. The size of
an instance of an assignment setting will be denoted by |R|which is equal to |N |×
|H|. Every randomized assignment yields a fractional assignment that specifies,
for every agent i and every house h, the probability pih that house h is assigned to
agent i. The fractional assignment can be seen as a compact representation of the
randomized assignment. RSD takes a permutation uniformly at random and then
lets the agents in the permutation serially take their most preferred house that has
not yet been allocated. If no acceptable houses remain, then the agent takes no
house.
It is easily observed that the assignment setting is a special case of a social
choice problem where A, the set of alternatives is the set of all discrete assign-
ments and the preferences of agents over A are induced by their preferences over
H . Although agents have strict preferences over the houses, they are indifferent
among all assignments in which they are allocated the same house. We illustrate
how RSD works as a random assignment rule.
Example 2 (Illustration of RSD for random assignment). Consider the following
preference profile.
1 : a P1 b P1 c
2 : a P2 b P2 c
3 : b P3 a P3 c
Agent 1 and 2 are of the same type since they have the same preferences. Let us
consider the Prio outcomes for each permutation over the voters. Each outcome
is a discrete matching.
123 : {{1, a}, {2, b}, {3, c}} 132 : {{1, a}, {3, b}, {2, c}}
213 : {{2, a}, {1, b}, {3, c}} 231 : {{2, a}, {3, b}, {1, c}}
312 : {{3, b}, {1, a}, {2, c}} 321 : {{3, b}, {2, a}, {1, c}}
Thus the RSD fractional assignment is obtained by taking the uniform convex
combination of the discrete assignments for each of the permutations (see Table 1).
Although the assignment setting is a subdomain of social choice (voting), it
does not mean that positive algorithmic results for voting imply the same for the
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a b c
1 1/2 1/6 1/3
2 1/2 1/6 1/3
3 0 2/3 1/3
Table 1: Fractional/randomized assignment as a result of RSD .
assignment domain. The reason is that the transformation from an assignment
setting to a corresponding voting problem leads to an exponential blowup in the
number of alternatives. Hence, results in the previous section do not carry over
directly to the domain of assignments.
Saban and Sethuraman [18] showed that it is not possible (under suitable
complexity-theoretic assumptions) to design an efficient algorithm for approxi-
mating the RSD probabilities even if randomization is used. Since neither ran-
domization nor approximation is helpful, this further motivates a parametrized
algorithm approach. The main result in this section is an FPT algorithm with
composite parameter number of houses and number of agent types. From this
result we derive two corollaries: There is a polynomial-time algorithm when the
number of agent types is constant, and an FPT algorithm with parameter number
of houses.
We use T to denote the number of agent types, and dj to denote the number of
agents of type j in the instance. With a slight abuse of notation, we will use Rj to
denote preference order of an agent of type j.
Theorem 2. In the assignment setting, for each i ∈ N and h ∈ H there is an al-
gorithm for computing RSD(R)(i)(h) running in O(|R|+(m+T
T
)
·T ·mT+1) time.
Proof. Let ~s = (s1, . . . , sT ) be a vector of integers where 0 ≤ sj ≤ dj for all
j = 1, . . . , T . Also let ~b = (b1, . . . , bT ) where bj ∈ H ∪ {nil} for j = 1, . . . , T .
Multiple entries of ~b can have the same house. Let dom(~b) be those houses that
are dominated by the allocation~b, namely, for each house h′ ∈ dom(~b), there must
be an agent type j that prefers h′ to bj ; more formally,
dom(~b) =
{
h′ ∈ H : ∃ j :
bj 6= nil ∧ h′ Pj bj , or
bj = nil ∧ h′ is acceptable to type j
}
.
For each (~s,~b) we define a residual problem where the set of houses available
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is H \ dom(~b) and there are sj agents of type j for each j = 1, . . . , T . Intuitively,
~b is maintained in a way so that each bj is the house most preferred by agent type
j that has yet not been allocated. Let j∗ be the type of agent i from the theorem
statement. Consider a permutation of the agents where there are sj agents of type
j and i is one of the agents of type sj∗—the precise identity of the other agents is
not important. We say such a permutation is lucky if running serial dictatorship
with this permutation on the residual instance results in assigning i to h.
We again use a dynamic programming formulation based on counting lucky
permutations in the residual problems
M [~s,~b] = # lucky permutations in the residual problem defined by (~s,~b).
Our goal now is to derive a recurrence relation for M [~s,~b]. We begin with
some base cases. First, if there are no agents of type j∗ left or if the house h is not
available anymore, then there are no lucky permutations; more formally,
M [~s,~b] = 0 if sj∗ = 0 or h ∈ dom(~b).
We say that ~b is degenerate if bj ∈ dom(~b) for some j. For such degenerate
vectors, let us define closure(~b) to be the vector ~˜b such that b˜j is the most preferred
house by agents of type j that does not belong to dom(~b) or nil if all acceptable
houses for agents of type j belong to dom(~b). It follows that if ~b is degenerate
then
M [~s,~b] = M [~s, closure(~b)].
Let nextj(h′) be the house that comes after h′ in the total order of type j
preferences. If h′ happens to be the last acceptable house for type-j agents then
nextj(h′) = nil. It is worth noting that closure(~b) can be defined recursively in
terms of the next operator:
closure(~b) =
{
closure(~b−j , nextj(bj)) if ∃ j : bj ∈ dom(~b),
~b if ∀ j : bj /∈ dom(~b),
where the notation (~b−j, x) denotes the vector that is identical to ~b except for
coordinate j, which takes the value x; in other words,
(~b−j , x) = (b1, . . . , bj−1, x, bj+1, . . . , bT ).
11
Our final corner case is that where there is an agent of type j such that bj = nil
and sj > 0. In this case it does not matter where the remaining sj agents of type j
are placed in the permutation since none of them will get a house. Therefore, we
get
M [~s,~b] =
(
s1 + · · ·+ sT
sj
)
sj! ·M [(~s−j , 0),~b].
For the recursive case of the recurrence, we condition on the type of agent
that is chosen to lead the lucky permutation. If the agent is of type j 6= j∗ and
bj 6= nil, assuming sj > 0, there are sj agents to choose from, so the number of
such permutations will be
sj ·M [(~s−j , sj − 1), (~b−j, nextj(bj))].
If the agent is of type j∗, assuming sj∗ > 0, and the agent is not i, then the number
of such permutations is
(sj∗ − 1) ·M [(~s−j∗ , sj∗ − 1), (~b−j∗, nextj∗(bj∗)].
Finally, if the agent of type j∗ leading the lucky permutation is i itself, then the
number of such permutations is{
(−1 +
∑
j sj)! if bj∗ = h
0 if bj∗ 6= h.
Putting everything together we get the following recurrence for (~s,~b) for the
case when~b is non-degenerate, h /∈ dom(~b), sj∗ > 0:
M [~s,~b] =
∑
j 6=j∗:
sj>0∧bj 6=nil
sj ·M [(~s−j , sj − 1), (~b−j, nextj(bj))]
+ (sj∗ − 1) ·M [(~s−j∗ , sj∗ − 1), (~b−j∗ , nextj∗(bj∗)]
+
{
(−1 +
∑
j sj)! if bj∗ = h
0 if bj∗ 6= h
(3)
Once the table is filled, the probability we are after is simply
RSD(R)(i)(h) =
M [(d1, . . . , dT ), (h1, . . . , hT )]
n!
,
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where hj is the house most preferred by agents of type j.
Let us bound the running time of the algorithm. First, we show how to effi-
ciently compute the set of agent types present in the instance, their frequencies and
preferences. Think of the linear preference relation of some agent as a “string”
whose “letters” are houses. Notice that two agents of the same type give rise to
the same string. In O(|R|) time we can generate the set of all string and build a
trie [Ch. 5, 19] out of them, keeping a frequency count of how many strings of
each kind we have seen, which correspond to how many agents of that type there
are.
Next, we need to bound the time it takes to fill the DP table. Notice that the
total number of entries M [~s,~b] can be as large as
∏
j dj ·m
T entries, since there
are
∏
j dj choices for ~s and mT choices for ~b. Unfortunately, this would be too
large for our purposes. The key observation is that not all possible vectors ~s are
reachable from our recurrence. In particular, notice that every time we apply (3)
we decrease
∑
j
sj by one and once all houses are assigned, the vector ~b must be
nil everywhere, which means we are at the base case of the recurrence. Therefore,
we only need to keep track of vectors ~s where
∑
j(dj − sj) ≤ m. There are only(
m+T−1
T−1
)
such vectors. Thus, the total number of entries we need to keep track
of is bounded by
(
m+T
T
)
·mT . Computing M [~s,~b] using (3) takes O(T ·m) time,
while using other cases of the recurrence takes O(m) time provided the function
closure(·) is already computed, which takes O(T · mT+1) time overall. Adding
everything up, we get that the total running time is O(|R|+
(
m+T
m
)
· T ·mT+1) as
it appears in the theorem statement.
Corollary 5. There is an FPT algorithm for computing RSD(R)(i)(h) with pa-
rameter m = # of houses. The running time is O(|R|+mmm).
Proof. Notice that when we have m houses, there can be at most ∑mk=1 k! agent
types, one for each total ordering of every subset of the m houses. The time bound
follows from plugging T = m!(1 + 2
m
) ≥
∑m
k=1 k! into Theorem 2:
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(
m+ T
T
)
· T ·mT+1 =
(
m+ T
m
)
· T ·mT+1,
≤
(m+ T )m
m!
·m!
(
1 +
2
m
)
·mm!(1+
2
m)+1,
≤
(
m+m!
(
1 +
2
m
))m
·
(
1 +
2
m
)
·mm!(1+
2
m)+1,
≤
(
m!
(
1 +
3
m
))m
·
(
1 +
2
m
)
·mm!(1+
2
m)+1,
≤ m!m ·
(
1 +
3
m
)m+1
·mm!(1+
2
m)+1,
≤ mm
2
· O(1) ·mm!(1+
2
m)+1,
= O(mm
m
),
where the last inequality follows from the upper bound m! ≤ e(m0.5)
(
m
e
)m
,
which is an easy consequence of Stirling’s approximation for factorial numbers.
Corollary 6. There is an algorithm for computing RSD(R)(i)(h) whose running
time is O(|R|+ T ·m2T+1).
Proof. The time bound follows directly from Theorem 2:(
m+ T
T
)
· T ·mT+1 ≤
(m+ T )T
T !
· T ·mT+1
≤ (m+ 1)T · T ·mT+1
= O(T ·m2T+1).
4. Conclusions
In this paper, we presented the first parametrized complexity analysis of RSD
both for the voting and assignment setting. For voting, we presented FPT algo-
rithms for parameters # agent types and # alternatives. For the assignment setting,
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Setting Parameter Complexity Reference
Voting n: # agents in FPT O(|R|+mn · 2n) Cor. 1
Voting T : # agent types in FPT O(|R|+mT · 2T ) Cor. 2
Voting m: # alternatives in FPT O(|R|+m · 3m · 23m) Cor. 3
Voting q: # alternative types in FPT O(|R|+ q · 3q · 23q) Cor. 4
Assignment m: # houses in FPT O(|R|+mmm) Cor. 5
Assignment T : # agent types O(|R|+ T ·m2T+1) Cor. 6
Table 2: Parametrized time complexity bounds for RSD
we presented an FPT algorithm for parameter # houses. Although an FPT algo-
rithm for the assignment setting with parameter # agent types still eludes us, we
showed that the problem is polynomial-time solvable if # agent types is constant.
We leave as an open problem to settle the parametrized complexity of RSD in the
assignment setting for the parameter p = # of agent types.
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